

From : **Muhammad Iqbal: Essays on the Reconstruction of Modern Muslim Thought** eds
Chad Hillier (redacteur), Basit Koshul (redacteur)

Ch [8] Iqbal, Bergson and the Reconstruction of the Divine Nexus in Political Thought by H. C. Hillier

[... Henri Bergson, the renowned French philosopher, wrote that each philosopher has only one great thing to say. This may also be true of Muhammad Iqbal (1875–1938) who greatly admired his French contemporary. In his own writings on poetry, philosophy, and politics, Iqbal had a singular preoccupation: the self or selfhood, called *khudi*, Iqbal's most significant intellectual contributions to humanity are notably his concept of *khudi* (selfhood), *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), mysticism and a commitment to a religion. ...]

{ W.E.: Girardianen worden verwezen naar extra literatuur over Bergson/Girard. O.a. in:

Benoît Chantre The Messianic Moment: Bergson and Girard. In: *Mimetic Theory and World Religions* (eds. W. Palaver and R. Schenk) p. 87 ff

Wolfgang Palaver: From Closed Societies to Open Society: Parochial Altruism and Christian Universalism. In *Can we survive our origins?* (eds P. Antonello and P. Gifford) p.97 ff }

Wolfgang Palaver: From the Sacred to Saintliness in France. In: *Transformation of the Sacred into Saintliness*. p. 39 ff. (electronische tekst)

..... { 175 }

This section will outline Iqbal's political theory and examine how Bergson's political ideas connect with and elaborate upon Iqbal's. These connections will be made in two areas: (1) the metaphysical foundations of the political; and (2) the particular sociopolitical ideas in both Iqbal and Bergson.

The Metaphysical Foundation of the Political: creativity and Individuality

For Iqbal, the foundation of any valid political system begins with recognizing the fundamental unity of the human experience. Unlike modernity, Iqbal asserts that human experience and knowledge cannot be fractured or subdivided, identifying one as valid and the other as suspicious. Human experience and knowledge is holistic, something that science simply fails to do because it cannot, by essence (by its particular rationalizing nature), provide a 'single Systematic view of Reality' (Iqbal 1932: 41). Rather it focuses upon what the intellect can understand based on sensual observations, and while this is an effective methodology in some areas of human knowledge, it cannot become metaphysical and thereby provide access to the source of all human knowledge and life. Likewise, human knowledge cannot be fractured or subdivided. {176} There are, however, different epistemologies related to different levels of the human mind, the most important being the intellect and intuition, according to Iqbal.

The metaphysical and epistemological importance of *intuition* and experience for Iqbal is drawn from the central tenants of Bergson's philosophy. Introduced in *Mind and Matter*, but articulated more fully in *Creative Mind* (1946), Bergson defines 'intuition' as a source of knowledge besides human intellect. Believing Kantian philosophy to be too abstract, Bergson sought for a more precise foundation and sources.⁸ (1911: 41). Unlike intelligence or intellect (that is, analytical reasoning), which is the traditional but limited intellectual source for science and philosophy, intuition is the

immediate holistic awareness of Reality itself (Cunningham 1916: 23). It is the most fundamental, direct, non-intellectual, and non-rational apprehension of Reality outside our senses and perception, one that exists prior to any ability to understand it. As Lawlor and Moulard note, 'Bergsonian intuition consists in entering into the thing, rather than going around it from the outside' (Lawlor and Moulard 2013). Intuition is the direct sympathetic experience of Reality where sympathy is understood as one person's entering into the experience of another person, and is the best source for metaphysics according to Bergson (1946: 159). So while sensual perception is assumed to be the most direct form of knowledge about Reality, there is a deeper experience to be known by entering into Reality itself. Wildon Carr (1914: 25) uses the example of the sentence. When a person hears a complete sentence, they first appreciate it as a whole. And yet, the same sentence may be broken down into smaller 'numerable elements', each of which can be appreciated in their own isolated part.

Both Bergson and Iqbal identify the intellect as the more analytical linear process of understanding, which perceives Reality as a series of separate and isolated things like a string of pearls. Intuition is the experience of 'undivided continuity', a stream of consciousness, which is then divided into parts and strung together by the intellect (Bergson 1911: 239). Gustavus Cunningham notes that intelligence is the faculty best suited for understanding matter. This is because it connects to Reality, to some degree, but it cannot take us beyond the matter and space. By contrast, intuition 'is capable of adequately seizing the real and of disclosing its total nature' (Cunningham 1916: 240). {177} Thus, where intelligence deals with knowing the material, intuition deals with knowing duration (Bergson 1911: 303). Like Bergson, Iqbal speaks of intuition as a higher form of the intellect. Known as mystical or religious insight, it is what the Qur'an calls the 'heart' (*fu'ad*). It is 'a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part' (Iqbal 1932: 16). Since intuition is an experiential form of knowledge, like all other experiential forms of knowledge (for example, sensual), it is immediate and accessible by all humans. However, contrary to some psychological theories, intuitional experience does not disconnect the individual from their rational conscience. Rather, intuitional experience (and knowledge) 'brings us into contact with the total passage of Reality in which all the diverse stimuli merge into one another and form a single unanalysable unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not exist' (17). It is as real as any other human experience and it produces knowledge just as true as any other source of knowledge. So what knowledge does intuitional experience of Reality present to us? When it comes to the problem of political life, it presents humans with two vital truths: the dynamic nature of Reality and the centrality of the human ego.

Iqbal asserts that the essence of the universe is change. He states that our experience of Reality reveals it to be 'a structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow' (45). This view of reality is consistent with the Qur'anic view of nature being characterized by succession and alternation (10: 6; 23: 80; 25: 62; 31: 27; 39: 5). Here he draws upon an idea shared by both Bergson and Whitehead. In *Creative Evolution*, Bergson states that from the privileged case of our own existence and the variations of emotional, psychological, and physical states we see how change 'is far more radical than we are at first inclined to suppose' (1922: 1). Change is the holistic passage from one state to another because the change of one area of our existence means change for all; therefore, in our experience, change is constant. Whitehead, a scholar influenced by Bergson, argued in *Science and the Modern World* (1997 [1920]) and *Process and Reality* (1978 [1929]) that Reality was composed not of material substance within a fixed cosmos, but of 'events', also labeled as 'actual

occasions' or 'experiences', within a dynamically moving and organically whole cosmos. This means that the universe and those things that exist {178} within it are essentially events, or occasional actualizations of experience, and not immutable dead matter. For instance, whether it is the electron or the human being, existing things are merely the interrelationship of different events. As such, because the actual existents of the cosmos are experiential events, the essential characteristics of the cosmos are change, freedom, and relations.

For Bergson, Iqbal, and Whitehead this holistic free creative movement of the universe, is time itself — that Bergson labels duration and Iqbal labels duration or destiny. Bergson defines duration as the 'contiguous process of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances' (1922:5). Since human consciousness itself is a subject of this duration, it repeatedly succeeds itself in a 'continuous' flow and can never exist in the same state twice. Like memory, which perceives past and present in a single moment, our intuitive mind (our consciousness) does not perceive the movement of time as a series of separate and isolated acts, but rather perceives the universe as a whole. As Iqbal (1932f: 49) articulates, it takes the 'string of separate temporal events and makes them into a real 'organic whole', as opposed to serial time that is merely pulverization of duration by the intellect. Furthermore, this ontology of change exhibits a creative force within existents of the cosmos that drives it towards a teleological end — an organic whole or harmony (Bergson 1922: 53). Contrary to Darwinian natural selection, this universal vital impetus (*élan vital*) is the principle of inner direction that moves parts towards a united effort.⁹ This vital impetus is the cause for variation within evolutionary history and it is the power that drives all parts towards a certain *telos*. Lawlor and Moulard note: 'If there is a *telos* to life, then, it must be situated at the origin and not at the end (contra traditional finalism), and it must embrace the whole of life in one single indivisible embrace (contra mechanism)' (2013).

Iqbal accepts Bergson's concept of duration and *élan vital*, to an extent, for he seems to assimilate the two into one deeper concept. The concept of duration is consistent with statements within the Qur'an regarding time (for example, 25: 58-9; 54: 49-50), as well as statements made in the Bible (for example, 1,000 years equals one day in heaven; see Psalm 90: 4, 2; Peter 3:8). Likewise, Iqbal argues that the Qur'an reveals Reality as possessing a 'free, unpredictable, creative impetus' (1932: 51). However, he seems to feel that {179} Bergson's theory of duration and *élan vital* 'ends in an insurmountable dualism of will and thought' (52). Iqbal argues that thought and life are equated, and both move towards a teleological end — a concept that he identifies with the Qur'anic notion of destiny (*taqdir*). Destiny, he argues, is not some unrelating fate or preordained events dripping forth across time, but an inward reach from the innermost being that 'forms the very essence of things' and becomes actualized in serial time. The Qur'an does not present a universe that is merely working-out a pre-conceived plan. 'The universe is not a mass of dead matter floating in empty space, fully completed eons ago by its Maker, but it is a growing and purposefully evolving universe. Unlike the mechanical vision of time in natural science,¹⁰ time needs to be understood as absolutely and creatively free, original, novel, and unforeseeable. As Iqbal writes:

The world process, or the movement of the universe in time, is certainly devoid of purpose, if by purpose we mean a foreseen end — a far-off fixed destination to which the whole creation moves. To endow the world process with purpose in this sense is to rob it of its originality and its creative character. (Iqbal 1932: 55)

So, essentially, for Iqbal, our intuitive mind has revealed that the cosmos moves in a deeper sense of time (for example, duration) and is teleo-logically driven by an essential force known as destiny or *élan vital*. Given that this force is absolutely free and creative, this *telos* is open and constantly being actualized. All of this, therefore, means that the Reality is essentially spiritual. While modernity has understood the world as material, the vision presented by Bergson and Iqbal (among others) is that even the material itself is spiritual. This, for Iqbal, is an idea shared by the all Abrahamic religions, as evidenced by the theological concept of 'God as Light' (Iqbal 1932: 71).

In such a cosmos, points of convergence and unity are characterized as Egos. Iqbal and Bergson both describe the formation of the human ego-self as the point where the intuitive mind (that perceives the cosmos holistically) unites with the more analytical intellect; our psyche-consciousness forms a formless and immutable ego to unite them (Bergson 1922: 5). Iqbal notes that it is impossible to even describe the internal experience of pure duration {180} in words, because language itself is shaped by the serial time of our intellect.¹¹ At this level, the states of our consciousness melt into each other, creating a unity of the ego where every experience is felt by the whole consciousness 'There is change and movement, but this change and movement are indivisible; their elements inter-penetrate and are wholly non-serial in character' (Iqbal 1932: 48).

Contrary to Bergson, Iqbal argues that the ego-self exists prior to duration (absolute time),¹² and, as such, this unity must be conceived as an all-embracing and concrete ego-self; for to exist in pure duration is to exist as a self-aware consciousness. Then, drawing from Bergson's and Lloyd Morgan's cosmological hierarchy of being, Iqbal (1932: 62—3) argues that there are degrees of spirit and individuality (see Bergson 1922), from the lowest atom to the highest complex being, all can be understood as egos — their degree being measured by the level of self-awareness. And since egos can only proceed from another ego, there is the existence of an ultimate ego that stands at the highest level of existence (that is, God). God, as the ultimate ego, is fully independent and complete. Unlike other egos, God's own self-awareness is so intuitive that it does not require a confrontation with creation to define itself.¹³

Due to its high degree of self-awareness, in this hierarchy of egos, humans rank nearest to the ultimate ego. Humans possess a higher degree of Reality, and, therefore are able to participate in the creativity of God by imagining and creating the world around them, for better or worse. This creative power is evident in the first choice made by the first humans. In an imaginative reading of the Qur'an, one that remains consistent with Bergson's theory of creative evolution,¹⁴ Iqbal interprets the myth of the Garden of Eden (*Jannat*) as a primitive pre-social state of nature. Unlike the Judeo-Christian utopia or the Hobbesian brutish dystopia, Iqbal perceives early humans as 'primarily governed by passion and instinct', from which emerges human consciousness and personal freedom (1932: 126). The Qur'an reveals that this emergence of freedom was a good thing. This means that, while the 'First act of free choice' by the first humans was disobedience, the '*Fall*' was not an emergence of moral depravity but an act of human self-awareness (85).

To understand Iqbal's political theory, especially when identifying the impact of Bergson, it is essential to begin with his metaphysics. Contrary to the modern tradition of political science, true knowledge about the universe cannot be fractured and limited to sensual observations only (that is, Hobbesian political scientific method). There is a deeper source of knowledge which reflects the nature of the universe more genuinely (that is, intuition or heart). This intuition reveals that the

fundamental characteristic of the cosmos is dynamic change. Change is holistic movement, constant evolution, and is essentially time itself (that is, duration). This developmental and evolutionary change is driven by a power (*élan vital* or destiny) that drives the cosmos and all that exists within it towards a purposeful end (*telos*). Within this cosmos are points of convergence, identified as egos. In fact, all existents in 'the cosmos from the smallest subatomic particular to the most complex creature are egos. As such, there exists a hierarchy of egos that advance by their degree of individuality and self-awareness and culminate in the highest ultimate ego — that is, God. Since egohood is defined by individuality and the cosmos by creativity, Iqbal and Bergson will argue that these are the foundational elements of the socio-political order. With this, one can see that the foundations of a reconstructed divine nexus are established in Iqbal's thought. His understanding of the cosmos, as a spiritual continuum, is characterized by dynamic creativity, teleological duration and ego-consciousness where egos, emerging from other egos, evolve along different levels of self-awareness until one finds the ultimate ego (that is, God). The 'God, man and world nexus', then, is understood as the interconnected points of convergence within a holistic system. This suggests, when discussing the socio-political implications, that there is an authoritative source in identifying the contours of human societies.

The Socio-political Alternative

In light of these assumed metaphysical principles, the socio-political ideal for Iqbal and Bergson is the development of human individuality and creative freedoms. Regarding individuality, Iqbal argues that the ideal society is the composite of ideal individuals.¹⁵ Ideal individuals are those who possess 'strong body and strong mind', free from all powers weakening its individuality. The human being, according to Iqbal, is an individual of infinite power, so that that strengthens this power is good and that that weakens it is bad; 'virtue is power... evil is weakness' (Iqbal 2002b: 87). Regarding freedom, like modern European Liberalism, he states that Islam affirms the {182} fundamental goodness of humans — contrary to the affirmation of humanity's wickedness found within Christianity and Christendom.¹⁶ Recognizing the ethical and political importance of this difference is vital. For, if humans are essentially wicked, then they cannot have freedom but must be controlled by external authority (for example, the divinely ordained priesthood in religion and autocracy in politics found in medieval Europe, or contemporary British rule in India).¹⁷ However, if humans are essentially good, then that promotes their natural freedoms promotes their goodness. Recognizing these truths make societies virtuous and respectful towards others. By rejecting them, or by denying their essential goodness (that is, original sin) and thereby idealizing other religious virtues that deny our humanity (that is, self-renunciation, poverty, obedience or otherworldliness), one actually weakens human individuality within society. So much so, Iqbal argues, that they are considered sins within Islam. It is this ethical vision that Bergson perceives is at the heart of the good society. Alexander Gunn, for instance, notes the social application of Bergson's philosophy:

[His philosophy] would involve the laying of greater stress upon the need for all members of society having larger opportunities of being more fully themselves, of being self-creative and having fuller power of self-expression as free creative agents. [It] would set in clearer light the claims of human personality to create and to enjoy a good life in the widest sense, to enter into fuller sympathy and fellowship with other personalities, and so develop a fuller and richer form of existence than is possible under present social and industrial conditions. Gunn 2007: 111)

In the social sphere, Bergson's philosophy would emphasize the need for society to support the creative development of individuals. It would place personality over property, emphasize how material goods are to be utilized for developing a good life, and place the development of full personality as the primary social and political goal. Bergson's most significant statements on social-political life came in his last publication, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (1935), which was published after Iqbal's *Reconstruction* (1932). Considering that this was his last major publication, it is valuable to notice what he considered were the {183} socio-political implications of his earlier doctrines. Like Iqbal, Bergson advocates a more holistic interrelationship between the individual and society. For instance, he argued that the institutions of church and state only differed by degree, not kind (Scherer 2006: 169).¹⁸ For example, one element within each institution is the concept of conversion by which both institutions seek to transform individuals by creating and assimilating new habits (171).

The notion of habit is important to Bergsonian socio-political thought. In his *Two Sources*, Bergson discusses the evolution of obedience, as our childhood experiences establish habits within us, for our past obedience to authority figures represented a non-conceptualized greater authority that we would later realize was obedience to society itself (1935). The relationship between the individual and society represents nature, just as cells are united together by unseen forces to develop into a hierarchy (Bergson 1935: 8—9). Scherer correctly interprets: 'Obligation accrues through experience in the forms of habits that demand satisfaction; these habits ensure the survival of individuals and communities by functioning regularly and dependently', but it means that the foundation of society is habit as the socialization of human habit is merely institution. Habit is a natural instinct for the human animal, whose only tools are the inorganic tools that humans develop to extend their bodies' abilities; as the craftsman uses a tool as an extension of his hand, so, too, is human society the inorganic extension of human intelligence and habit (Scherer 2006: 182f).

Habit is a sufficient enough foundation for society, in Bergson's mind, for society generally operates without the need for interference; we know what is expected from us and what we in turn expect. This habitualization has been engrained and enforced through various social relationships and identifications (for example, family, church, work, and country), becoming instinctual for each individual. Habitualization creates obligation, obligation engrains a sense of duty, and fulfilling one's duties grants a greater sense of individual continuance with the greater society (Bergson 1935: 18f.; Scherer 2006: 186).

While habitualization appears to be a non-creative process, Bergson sees this as a continuing, dynamic, and open process. Like Kant, Bergson believed that obligation presupposed freedom, because an individual does not feel obligation unless they have freedom (1935: 19). In fact, Bergson identifies two {184} kinds of societies: the closed society and the open society. The closed society is, in essence, a society that maintains a circular repetition of institutionalized habits, remaining exclusively self-sufficient. The closed society aims at cohesion, where the citizen has a sense of well-being rooted in stability and regularity without serious crisis. 'The open society, however, is one that sees itself as the universalized humanity-at-large, rooted in the obligation of 'love' (as conceived within the mystical traditions). This emotional impetus is powerful enough to disrupt habitual slumber, and inspire creativity. Members of the society act upon emotionally driven inspiration (*élan vital*) to create natural habits and actions, much like an artist who is emotionally inspired and then must act upon that inspiration (Bergson 1935).

In a society open to this, Scherer summarizes, Bergson sees creative emotions as forces that drive institutions toward the universal and thereby transform them; and because they form a natural response towards action, as habits do, they can form a foundation for ethical life. The difference between actions from habit and those from creative emotions is not only their beginnings, but also their ends, as fulfillment of habit gives pleasure, while fulfillment of creative emotion gives joy. Both forces, however, work dynamically within social institutions, and only intellect can explain both (Scherer 2006: 96f.).

While Iqbal does not use the concept of 'habit' in *Reconstruction* or other writings, probably because his philosophy was published before Bergson's, I believe that there is an argument that the notion of 'habit', and even more the notion of 'obligation', can be the foundations of society.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it could be argued that Iqbal actually presents a socio-political theory that is more consistent with their shared metaphysical principles than Bergson himself is within *Two Sources*.²⁰ This is because, for Iqbal, society is driven by particular fundamental powers — and two in particular, what he labels force and conflict. His notion of force is the generic parallel to Bergson's *élan vital* and destiny but expressed within the socio-political order, Force cannot be understood as sheer physical power; rather he states: 'I believe in the power of the spirit, not brute force' (Iqbal 2002b: 95).²¹ Force is, for Iqbal, the divine tendency in the universe that drives its evolution. There is a spiritual power that drives the creative evolution of individuals, societies, and the entire cosmos itself. It drives every element of the universe to evolve after eons into its present state, from the atom, to the human, and to the human civilization. {185} However, since these evolved forms are inherently unstable and weak, they achieve higher forms of evolution through overcoming conflict.

Conflict plays an important role in Iqbal's political theory. As with his metaphysical belief of a teleologically evolving universe, Iqbal speaks of progressively evolving requirements of ideal individuals and society, in removing 'social problems, to settle our disputes, and to place international morality on a surer basis' (2002a: 183). It is when our (*élan vital*) force-driven egos and societies overcome conflicts that they evolve into their higher forms (even immortality). While Iqbal expands the ideas of force and conflict, parallel ideas are found in Bergson as well. For instance, in a discussion of war, he argues that there is a point where, as Soulez notes, 'Life [*élan vital*] no longer drives societies via the clash of wills towards their integration in a finally unified humanity', but rather it drives the destruction of humanity itself over the destruction of one's enemies (2013: 110). Socio-political order, therefore, is necessary for both Bergson and Iqbal. This is because human societies are the locations where humans develop and actualize these forces, overcome their conflicts, and evolve towards their ideal forms of development (Iqbal 2002a: 186). Moreover, both Bergson and Iqbal seem to agree on the single most significant threat to the development of human individuality and human societies — exclusion of the other. For Bergson, it is this instinct for exclusion that has made racism so common. When that notion of exclusion is magnified by science (that by its nature divides and labels), exclusionism opens the door to extermination (Bergson 1935: 71—8). Iqbal expresses similar sentiments:

Tribal or national organizations on the lines of race or territory are only temporary phases in the enfoldment and upbringing of collective life; and as such I have no quarrel with them; but I condemn them in the strongest possible terms when they are regarded as the ultimate expression of the life of mankind. (Iqbal 2002a: 187)

For Iqbal, Islam transcends all such divisions — not just for Muslims, but for all humans. The Qur'an calls upon all people to overlook their differences and unite on their commonalities. He states: 'All men and not just Muslims alone are meant for the kingdom of God on earth, provided they say good-bye to their idols of race and nationality, and treat one another as personalities'²² (Iqbal 2002a: 187). {186} The resolution or solution of the modern socio-political crisis in Iqbal and Bergson are parallel, but unique to each philosopher. Naturally, in reintroducing the divine nexus, the key for both is found in religion. In *Two Sources*, Bergson distinguishes between two systems: the closed and the open. The closed system is characterized by a closed religion, closed morality, and closed society, whereas the open system is characterized by their counterparts. Humans are animals who need a community in order to survive, and the closed society is focused on survival, continuance and 'social cohesion' (Bergson 1935: 21). Thus, the protection of the society and its members from the threat of nature and death, over the promise of life, is its highest ideal (175). In this, the closed society is constantly at war, or perceives itself as under the constant threat of war or social destruction. Since the closed society is focused upon survival, its religion and morality seek to solidify the ideals of the closed society. As such, it is guided by a morality of exclusion and rigid obedience to the laws (that is, its Kantian categorical imperatives). When these laws are challenged, the intellectual focus of society is directed at finding reasons to support the existing structures, institutions, and codes. Likewise, the religion of such a society is focused on preserving the traditional socio-political order. To secure the obedience needed to maintain authoritative tradition, its deity forbids, threatens, commands, and condemns.

The open society, however, is one that possesses different kind of religion and morality altogether. Focused on promoting life, peace, and inclusion, the open society specifically aims at enabling the essential capabilities needed for a full-human life (that is, freedom and creativity) universally. Unlike being driven by the pressure of social cohesion and obedience, members of the open society are driven by an internal attraction towards some such ideal or ideals. Our actualization of these ideals is accompanied by corresponding emotions. For the closed society, it is a sense of general well-being and a sense of pleasure (and joy). For the open society, however, the emotion created is one of 'enthusiasm' (39) — an enthusiasm from the sense of progress and forward development. These ideals are typically represented by the exemplars from that society — the heroes, prophets, law-givers, and mystics — who have made a deep mystical (intuitive) connection with the creative source of life itself (that is, God) and who embody these ideals (31, 81). This mystic is like an artist, in that s/he creates things in Reality. This attraction transcends {187} intellect and analytical reason, and is rooted in a deeper and more holistic kind of human understanding — that is, mysticism. This mysticism (or connection with the creative source) cannot be ascetic or monastic, but it must inspire some genuine activity within the world, in fact, the very nature of this experience is to connect to God (the creative source), and flow back towards humanity, which cannot be taught, but 'it has only to show itself, and its mere presence may stir others to action' (40). So while not all humans may obtain this mystical experience, they may awaken such deeper connections within us, and thus inspire us to action. All human individual and socio-political progress has 'always been from the contact with the generative principle of the human species', from which humanity has drawn its strength to love one another and inspire a more open morality (41). 'The 'mystic society, embracing all humanity and moving animated by a common will', will create a more complete humanity (67). So much so, Bergson argues, that justice will be replaced by charity, and the society eventually resolves its moral problems.

Naturally, Iqbal also asserts the fundamental importance of religion in the socio-political order. Reality, characterized as being spiritual in essence, drives social evolution in order to resolve its problems. In a Hegelian sense, Iqbal argues that Ultimate Reality (or Universal Spirit) manifests its driving force through great historical individuals and through their civilisations.²³ At the same time, Iqbal (2002a: 183) asserts that the resolutions cannot be found in 'treatises, leagues, arbitrations and conferences' but within a living personality (ego). This living personality cannot be a mere politician or philosopher, but someone who enables humanity to see the Divine both within revelation and within them (that is, a prophet). This person has ascended to the 'highest heavens' and had an intense 'unitary experience' with the divine ego (Iqbal 1932: 124). This experience' is rooted in the Qur'anic idea of 'inspiration' (*wahy*). Inspiration is more than merely a religious experience according to Iqbal; it is 'a universal property of life', which is characterized differently in different stages of organic life — from the growth of the plant, to the evolution of a new organ in an animal, to the spiritual depth in human life (125). Inspiration is the metaphysical source for human civilizations. The intuitive human knowledge of duration, *élan vital*, creative change, spiritual nature of Reality, its Ultimate Source (that is, God), and the human mystical {188} experience of it epitomized in the prophet inspires creative and transformative change. Both Bergson and Iqbal reject the notion that the mystical experience drives the person inwards. Rather, the prophet (for Iqbal) and the mystic (for Bergson),²⁴ insert themselves into the movement of time (duration) 'with a view to control the forces of history' (123). Moreover, neither Iqbal nor Bergson conceived the prophet-mystic as a politician, but someone whose impact was more civilizational.

The fact that both Iqbal and Bergson place the prophet-mystic at the heart of civilizations and societies implies something vital for modern socio-political thought: the importance of religion. All genuine societies find their unity through something that transcends those things that divide humans: ethnicity, nationalism, and tribalism. True unity is spiritual unity. This is because religion is not some irrational experience, covered then by a layer of speculative knowledge, but religion is a metaphysic in itself (94). The primary form of commitment and identity for humans originates from their metaphysical beliefs. What they believe about the nature of the cosmos, the origin and nature of the universe, and the nature of the things that exist within it (that is, humans), provides the reasons, contours, and motivations for their socio-political activity. In extension, then, there must also be a shared agreement on metaphysical beliefs that lie at the heart of a particular society. (For instance, one could see how modern liberal secular society depends upon a shared belief regarding human nature.) If religion, as a metaphysic, is more reflective of the natural order of the universe, then religion ought to be a better foundation for human societies. Yet, this metaphysical-religious source for human socio-political unity is more than merely shared intellectual belief; it is also the source for creating a shared expression of humanity. Human societies produce a particular kind of character within their members, a character that reflects the 'uniform mental outlook' or shared world-view. This process of forming character is known as culture, and culture is essential because it gives a place for the individual within society to examine and evaluate their world. For Iqbal, and I would assert for Bergson as well, religion is the best vehicle through which a society's particular world-view and the cultural formation of its members is fulfilled. Religion has a particular view of the universe that suggests 'a new type of character tending to universalize itself' (Iqbal 2002c: 176f). {189} The more universalized and more consistent with Reality a religion is, the more successful is its ability to inspire socio-political flourishing.

For Iqbal, Islam is that religion. The ideal of a universal society based upon a shared religious vision was originally a product of Jesus and Christianity, but with its monastic focus it was unable to actualize its vision when assimilated by Imperial Rome. As such, according to Iqbal, this ideal was finally epitomized by the Prophet Muhammad and Islamic civilization, which rejected tribalism and promoted a socio-political unity based upon religion. Muslim culture, as the 'product of cross-fertilization of the Semitic and the Aryan ideas (178), looks to create a universalized human culture that transcends nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, class, and sectarianism.²⁵ It is a society whose citizenship does not depend upon birth, but through the explicit, individual, voluntary, and public identification with Islam and the global Muslim community (that is, the *ummah*). This means that Islam provides more than a pan-Islamic society; it is the foundation for a pan-human society.

The reason that Islam is the better foundation for a more universal human society, according to Iqbal, is that modern Western societies maintain and promote values that divide humans, humanity, and human nature itself — in particular through its commitment to secularism. He states: 'The state is not a combination of sacred and secular, but a unity without such distinctions' (Iqbal 2002d: 118),²⁶ For Islam, human unity is both religious and political. A nationality based on any 'material limitations' is not the highest limit of political development for humanity. Instead, the 'political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities', although sharing a common historical heritage given by the Prophet (117). Therefore, Iqbal's response to the Western Liberal Nationalism and its Great Separation is Islam. Islam and the society it inspires transcends chronic human divisions. Islamic society is global, inclusive, and best develops full humanity. Humans, in general, and Muslims in particular, would be best served by a society that eliminates obstacles and empowers individuals. While the goal for all Muslims should be the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate (Iqbal 1932: 159), Iqbal concedes that nationalism is currently the prominent socio-political system in which human individuality develops into its higher forms. He argues that nationalism, particularly Muslim nationalism, {190} has continuing practical relevance and utility to Muslims today. This is because, in the international arena, there is no sympathy for weakness and only power is respected. Since Muslims globally find themselves in weakness, it is prudent that they seek to strengthen themselves by establishing workable independent modern states. The nationalistic separation of the *ummah* is a temporary situation, as each separated Muslim nation will 'sink into her own deeper self' to focus on her own vision until such time as Muslim nations are powerful enough 'to form a living family of republics' (that is, an Islamic League of Nations) (ibid.). So, in his famous Presidential Address before the All-Muslim League, Iqbal states that the goal for Indian Muslims is to create their own nation-state in north-west India (i.e. Pakistan).²⁷

Even still, Iqbal asserts that nationalism poses the single most vital danger for Indian Muslims. The problem with Western-styled nationalism is its secularism. While Iqbal does not mention so-called wars of religion in Europe, he argues that secularism is the natural outworking of Christianity's otherworldly emphasis. Thus, the universal ethic of Jesus is replaced by the nationalistic ethic of Protestantism. This is not the case within Islam. 'Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter,' asserts Iqbal. 'In Islam, God and the universe, spirit and matter, Church and State, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam, matter and spirit realize itself in space and time' (Iqbal 2002e:193f.). In what could be identified as the most significant insight from his years living in Europe, Iqbal argues that European secular nationalism has driven religion out of public discourse. In doing so, it has rooted the ultimate interests of the state within nationalism and

not humanism (Iqbal 2002e: 194). The West has become a political civilization, which sees man as a thing to be exploited. As such, it is natural for it and its oppressive economic system to be in conflict with Islamic cultures (Iqbal 2002f: 215, 2002e: 192). So, Iqbal rejects European views of nationalism, not because they will hurt Islamic societies materially, but because in them he sees 'the germs of atheistic materialism', which is the greatest danger to modern humanity' (Iqbal 202: 212). Islam cannot accept the notion of privatized religion in the socio-political order. Iqbal states: 'The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically {191} related to the social order which it created. 'The rejection of one will eventually involve the rejection of the other' (ibid.). This means that the development of nationalistic polity outside of Islamic values of solidarity and unity is unthinkable, and Muslims therefore need independent socio-political self-determination united within a larger federated India (akin to Canada).²⁸ Since India is a multicultural, multi-ethnic, multinational, and multi religious state, which seeks for genuine equality between race, religion, and class, race-conscious European ethnic nationalism is inapplicable (Iqbal 2002e: 200—1). The creation of a Muslim state within a federated India would not be a 'religious' state, for the idea of religion' as a phenomenon distinct from all other areas of human life is a concept alien to Islam. Unlike a church, Islam is 'a State conceived as a contractual organization long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature... but a spiritual being understood in terms of social mechanism'; for Iqbal considers 'politics have their roots in the spiritual life of man' (201).

Conclusion

Muhammad Iqbal is, arguably, one of the most significant voices of modern Islamic and Indian nationalism (Esposito 1983; Esposito and Vol. 2001). 'This chapter sought to identify the major ideas of Iqbal's political theory, which he formulated in order to resolve an epistemological crisis created by Western imperial colonialism. A significant element of this effort was the assimilation of Bergson's metaphysical ideas into a modernization of Islamic thought. While Iqbal did not simply absorb Bergson without criticism, it is evident that the two philosophers shared many fundamental ideas on the nature of reality, human understanding, and a good human society. Notably, both philosophers saw that the cosmos was spiritual in essence, and that this cosmos was driven by a divine Creative Force, that is teleological in nature. This force has moved all things in an evolutionary process towards greater actualization and empowerment. 'This vision of Reality has the capacity to inspire, by recognizing that the Creative Force that is at work in our evolving universe allows humans to strive in creating societies that best support their individual evolutionary developmental process. 'The best of these societies are those that derive their inspiration from individuals who access the {192} Creative Force in a deeper way (that is, prophets and mystics) and therefore inspire a society more universal and consistent with the purposes of Reality (Iqbal 2002a: 183—6). The implications of this convergence and union are significant for scholars of philosophy and Islamic studies, and examining the legacy of *Bergsonian—Process* thought within modernist and reformist Islamic thought has only begun.

Additionally, this chapter sought to show how this reconstructed divine nexus aspires to overcome the oppressive and restrictive limitations created by modern Western societies, notably nationalism, racism, classism, and secularism. Both Iqbal and Bergson assert the fundamental importance of religion in society. Bergson (1935: 80—2), for instance, contends that religion is not merely the help mate of morality, but rather it is the drive, the impulse, and the impetus for society itself. With that,

both add that religion exists between the real and the ideal in society, and that church and state are essentially the same, in that they differ only in degree not in kind (Iqbal 1932: 9; Bergson 1935: 67) This is important because metaphysical-religious commitments (even if they involve the denial of metaphysics) transcend all other forms of intellectual commitment. This means that metaphysical beliefs, even if unarticulated, exist prior to our socio-political values, and they influence our human activities. This is evidenced by Iqbal's criticism of the inherent nationalism and racism within Western societies being dependent upon a metaphysical belief regarding human nature.

So, in response to Lilla's thesis, the modern detachment of political thought from religion and metaphysics characterized by Hobbes and Locke may have been successful in a time when the metaphysical theories of the period were no longer consistent with developments in science. Iqbal, drawing upon European philosophy (Bergson), science and the Qur'an, however, was able to develop a metaphysical theory and Islamic theology that is more consistent with the scientific knowledge of the period, and a political theory that overcomes the problems of Western secular-liberal nationalism and promotes values more consistent with human freedom and fuller developmental capabilities.

Notes

1. Bergson was given ambassadorial responsibilities by France in the United States, was involved in the development of the League of Nations, and later appointed president of the International Commission for Intellectual Cooperation (CICI) for the Leagues of Nations (as precursor to UNESCO) (Soulez and Worms 2002: 150—4).

2. For instance, Bergson has been called an enemy of parliamentarism' (Schmidt 1985: 109—10) and accused of producing an 'élan vital of the bourgeoisie' (Boch 1938: 319—20).

3. The ethical ideal in Islam is a strong will and strong body, but this is not found among Indian Muslims, who have become 'enfeebled, self-dwarfing, dependent, and spiritually lazy', which is called 'contentment'. This is merely dependence, Iqbal contends, which is found in various ways: the young and educated-Muslim seeks civil service, the middle-class is not able to unite economically because of mistrust, and the rich see trade-work as humiliating. Iqbal even speaks of the physical weakness of Indian school children. which further limits their power to light subjection. (He, rather, idealizes the lowly shopkeeper, who despite being illiterate works hard and will fight for his family.) Iqbal argues that education is a poor vehicle for moral training, but in the low socio-economic context of India, education is the only method for individual development. However, while education in India has provided 'bread and butter', it has failed to make India a 'living nation' as Indian school children know more about the Puritan Revolution than they know their own history (Iqbal 2002b: 93—6).

4. For Bergson, see Iqbal (1932: 3, 35—6, 39, 46—8, 51, 52—5, 57, 62, 141).

5. Iqbal's identification with this school challenges the misinterpretation of Iqbal as a Nietzschean philosopher an interpretation common among Euro-American commentators (for example, Schimmel 1985) even during Iqbal's own lifetime. It was something that he personally rejected in a letter to his English friend and translator Dr Nicholson. In it he stated: 'Some English reviewers, however, have been misled by the superficial resemblance of some of my ideas to those of Nietzsche' (2002a: 189). He contends, rather, that many apparently Nietzschean ideas are rooted more in Sufi thought, and are better understood through the thought of British philosopher Samuel Alexander, who admittedly was indebted to Bergson.

6. The contours and criticism of this myth has been expertly examined in William T. Cavanaugh's book, *The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict* (2009). Juan Cole challenged

Lilla by arguing, ‘when Europeans are confronted with renewed experiences of cycles of violence at the end of the twentieth century around the world, they do not remember the history of European [nonreligious-nationalist inspired] violence of the twentieth century, but rather retrieve the forgotten histories of the wars of religion of early modern Europe’ (Cole et al. 2013: 19). So, the popular Western belief is that secularism, found enshrined in the doctrine of the separation of church and state, is essential in order to prevent religious-based violence.

7. This is the third stanza ‘Bergson’, from his poem Locke, Kant and Bergson, in which he uses the metaphor of a tulip to distil the central ideas of each philosopher. He places Bergson at the culmination of modern European thought and highlights the idea of *élan vital*,

8. This is a point that Frederick Copleston (1994: 180) also makes in *A History of Philosophy*. Volume IX Modern Philosophy.

9. Bergson asserts that Darwinian evolutionist theory fails to explain how different parts can perform the same duties, despite their parts being differently situated and differently constituted and having different functions (1922: 80).

10. Iqbal states: ‘Science seeks to establish uniformities of experience, i.e., the laws of mechanical repetition. Life with its intense feeling of spontaneity constitutes a centre of indetermination, and thus falls outside the domain of necessity. Hence science cannot comprehend life.’ Iqbal argues that the biologist who limits himself to a mechanical worldview does so because he confines himself to examining lower forms of life and generalises from that. If this biologist examined life as revealed in himself, for example, free will and critical thought, he would see ‘the inadequacy of his mechanical concepts’ (Iqbal 1932: 50).

11. Iqbal gives the example of a ray of light that is comprised of billions of particles. While it would take thousands of years to observe each particle, the ray as a whole is observed by the eye in an instant.

12. Iqbal argues that Bergson’s mistake, positing that pure ‘time and space are prior to ego-self, comes in the fact that these notions cannot rightly conceptualise the ‘multiplicity of objects and events’; for this intellection only occurs with an ‘appreciative act of an enduring self that transforms the multiplicity ‘to the organic wholeness of a synthesis’ (Iqbal 1932: 55).

13. Iqbal states: the not-self does not present itself as a confronting “other”, or else it would have to be like our finite self, in spatial relation with the confronting “other”. What we call Nature or not-self is a fleeting moment in the life of God. His “I-amness” is independent, elemental, absolute. Of such a self it is impossible for us to form an adequate conception. As the Qur’an says, “Naught” is like Him; yet “He hears and sees” (Iqbal 1932: 56).

14. Bergson’s theory of creative evolution was developed further by Samuel Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, both referred to by Iqbal. See Alexander (1920); Bergson (1922); Morgan (1923).

15. In his ‘Letter to Dr. Nicholson’, Iqbal states that ideal individuals are expressions of a divine tendency in the universe, a notion that should be understood through Samuel Alexander’s metaphysical notion of the perfect man. While Iqbal rejects Alexander’s placement of God within the space—time continuum, he admits that his metaphysical beliefs are influenced by Meander rather than Nietzsche (2002a: 182).

16. Iqbal states: ‘Ethically speaking, therefore, man is naturally good and peaceful. Metaphysically speaking, he is a unit of energy, which cannot bring out its dormant possibilities owing to its misconception of the nature of its environment. The ethical ideal of Islam is to disenthral man from fear, and thus to give him a sense of his personality, to make him conscious of himself as a source of power’ (2002b: 86).

17 Iqbal asserts the power of autocracy in medieval society was so engrained that it took a revolution, Luther in religion and Rousseau in politics, to emancipate Europe (2002b: 86).

18 In fact, for Bergson, religion lies between the Law of Nature and the Command of Society; between the transcendent ideal and the approximate real (Iqbal 1935: 10).

19 In a statement on Freud's notion of the unconscious, Iqbal does appear to favour the notion of habit as primary in human behaviour, and how our responses to stimuli habituate and 'gradually fall into a relatively fixed system, constantly growing in complexity by absorbing some and rejecting other impulses which do not fit in with our permanent system of responses' (1932: 24). Elsewhere, Iqbal (1932: 90) refers to the notion of habit in three ways. First, in discussing patterns of the rational mind, he asks if patterns of concrete thinking are merely habituated patterns of thought. Second, in evolution, he wonders if biological adaptation is simply the formation of fresh habits or modification of old ones (22—3). Third, he wonders if the nature and activities of the human body are purely the 'accumulated action or habit of the soul' (103). In fact, in discussing God as Absolute Ego, Iqbal (56) notes how 'Nature' is not matter occupying a void, but a structure of events and a mode of behaviour connected to some organic Self— something that the Qur'an calls the 'habit of Allah'.

20. In *Two Sources*, Bergson is occasionally inconsistent with his own ideas and methodology, a point also made by Soulez (2013).

21. Iqbal notes that some critics charge him with deifying physical force and conflict in his evolutionary theological-political theory. Here Iqbal admits the periodic need for 'righteous war', which is opposed to wars of conquest. He argues that people have the duty to fight in a righteous war but not in one of conquest; in the end, however, all war is destructive and must end eventually (see Iqbal 2002a: 183). Elsewhere, Iqbal challenges those European critics who argue that Islam can only exist and strive in a state of war. He 'reasons that war is an expression of the energy of a nation and a necessity for the survival of all nations — both in international competition and in the human evolution a process. He contends that Islam permits only defensive wars and adds that the Prophet Muhammad engaged only 'in defensive wars and placed restrictions on killing women, children, and the sick, and destroying the economical and physical infrastructure of a nation. Iqbal notes that political expansion in Islam was not only the by-product of war but missionary work as well, noting that the greatest political expansions happened in the peaceful conversions of the Malaysians, the Mongols, and South Asians. Islam is essentially a religion of peace, which denounces all forms of political and social disorder, even forbidding the secret meeting, which is the heart of such disorder. All methods of violent social change are rejected — rather Islam aims to secure social peace at any cost. Iqbal, therefore, disparages those Muslims who criticise their Christian government and adds that their situation is reminiscent of' the first Muslim migration to the Christian nation of Abyssinia, reminding them of the Qur'anic verse that speaks of the closeness of Christians and Muslims (see Iqbal 2002b: 96—100).

22. While Muslims have battled and conquered, with some merely personal ambitions covered with a veil of religion, these were 'not part of the original program of Islam' but a re-paganisation' of their beliefs. Instead, Islam aims at absorption', not territorial conquest, but a teaching that appeals to the common sense of humanity (Iqbal 2002a: 187).

23. See Hegel (1975: Section 3, paragraphs 24—39).

24. While Iqbal clearly distinguishes the mystic from the prophet, arguing that the one is inward-focused and the other outward, Bergson's use of the word mystic is similar to Rousseau's 'Lawgiver' (Soulez 2013: 106; Bergson 1935:77)— thus making Iqbal's 'prophet' and Bergson's mystic roughly synonymous.

25. The problem is that division has taken hold in Islam, and all distinctions of sect (Sunni, Shia; Wahabi, and so forth) and class must be eliminated in order to allow humanity to evolve freely.

26. 'The Caliph is not a divine representative but a fallible man like others. Even the Prophet is considered by some theologians to be fallible' (Iqbal 2002c: 118).

28. Iqbal states: "Thus it is clear that in the view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages. creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous States based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India' (Iqbal 2002e: 201).

References

- Alexander, Samuel (1920), *Space, Time and Deity*, vols I and 2, London: Macmillan & Co.
- Bergson Henri (1911), *Mind and Matter*, London: Macmillan.
- (1922), *Creative Evolution*, London Macmillan.
- (1935), *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, London: Macmillan.
- (1946), *Creative Mind*, New York: The Philosophical Library.
- Boch, Ernst (2009), *The Heritage of Our Times*, Cambridge: Polity.
- Cavanaugh, William T. (2009), *The Myth of Religious Violence. Secular ideology and the Roots of Modern conflict* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cobb Jr., John and David Ray Griffin (1996), *Process Theology: An introductory Exposition*, Louisville: Westminster-John Knox.
- Cole, Juan, Michael Jon Kessler, John Milbank and Mark Lilla (2013), 'A Conversation', in Michael Jon Kessler (ed.), *Political Theology for a Plural Age*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 13—42.
- Copleston, Frederick (1994), *A History of Philosophy Volume IX.* Modern Philosophy New York: Doubleday.
- Cunningham, Gustavus Warts (1916), *A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson*, New York: Longmans, Green & Co.
- Esposito, John I. (1983), *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Esposito, John L. and John Obert Vol.1 (2001), *Makers of contemporary Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gerber, Haim (1999), *Islamic Law and Culture, 1600—1840*, Leiden: Brill.
- Gunn, J. Alexander (2007), *Bergson and His Philosophy*. Charleston: BiblioLife.
- Haj, Samira (2009), *Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality and Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Hegel, G. W. F. (1975), *Lectures on Philosophy of World History*, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1985), *Leviathan*, London: Penguin Classics.
- Hourani, Albert (1983), *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Howard, Damian A. (2011), *Being Human in Islam: The Impact of the Evolutionary Worldview*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Hustwit, J. R. (2007), 'Process Philosophy'. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/plprocessp.htm.
- Iqbal, Muhammad (1932), *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Dubai: Kitab al-Islamiyyah.
- ([1990] 2008), *Tulip in the Desert: A Selection of the Poetry of Muhammad Iqbal*, ed. Mustansir Mir, Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan.

- (2002a), ‘Letter to D. Nicholson’, in Fateh Mohammad Malik (ed.), *Muslim Political Thought: A Reconstruction*, Islamabad: Alharma, pp. 181—91.
- (2002b), ‘Islam as a Moral and Political Ideal’, in Fateh Mohammad Malik (ed.), *Muslim Political Thought: A Reconstruction*, Islamabad: Alharma, pp. 79—106.
- (2002c), ‘The Muslim Community’, in Fateh Mohammad Malik (ed.), *Muslim Political Thought: A Reconstruction*, Islamabad: Alharma, pp. 175—81.
- (2002d), ‘Political Thought in Islam’, in Fateh Mohammad Malik (ed.), *Muslim Political thought: A Reconstruction*, Islamabad: Alharma, pp. 113—33.
- (2002e), ‘Separate Muslim Nationhood in India’, in Fateh Mohammad Malik (ed.), *Muslim Political Thought: A Reconstruction* Islamabad: Alharma, pp. 191—210.
- (2002f), ‘Towards Separate Muslim Homelands’, in Fateh Mohammad Malik (ed.), *Muslim Political thought: A Reconstruction*, Islamabad: Alharma, pp. 210—23.
- (2005), *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia: A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy*, Whitefish Kessinger.
- ([1990] 2008), *Tulip in the Desert A Selection of the Poetry of Muhammad Iqbal*, trans. and ed. Mustansir Mir, Montreal: McGill; Queen’s University Press.
- (2010), *Poetry of Allama Iqbal*, trans. and ed. Khwaja. Tariq Mahmood, New Delhi: Siar Publications.
- Kurzban, Charles (2002), *Modernist Islam: 1840—1940*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lawlor, Leonard and Valentine Moulard (2013), ‘Henri Bergson’, *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bergson>.
- Lilla, Mark (2008), *The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics and the Modern West*, London: Vintage.
- Locke, John (1997), *Political Essays*, ed. Mark Goldie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair (1988), *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
- March, Andrew (2007), ‘Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in Non-Muslim Liberal Democracies’, *American Political Science Review*, 101(2): 235—52.
- Mir, Mustansir (2007), *Iqbal: Makers of Islamic Civilization*, London: I. B. Tauris.
- Morgan, C. Lloyd (1923), *Emergent Evolution*, New York: Henry Holt & Co.
- Morris, Randall C. (1991), *Process Philosophy and Political Ideology*, Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Mullarkey, John (1999), *Bergson and Philosophy*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Rescher, Nicholas (2002), ‘Process Philosophy’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy>
- Rutherford, Donald (ed.) (2006), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Scherer, Matthew (2006), *The Politics of Persuasion: Habit, Creativity, Conversion* (PhD dissertation, Johns Hopkins University).

Schimmel, Annemarie (1985), *Gabriel's Wing: A Study into the Religious Ideas of Sir Muhammad Iqbal*, Leiden Brill.

Schmidt, Carl (1988), *The crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, trans. Ellen Kennedy, Boston: MIT Press.

Sevea, Iqbal Singh (2012), *The Political Philosophy of Muhammad Iqbal: Islam and Nationalism in Late Colonial India*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shafique, Khurram Ah (2007), *Iqbal, an Illustrated Biography*, Lahore: Iqbal Academy Pakistan.

Soulez, Phillipe (2013), 'Bergson as Philosopher of War and Theorist of the Political', in Alexandre Lefebvre and Melanie White (eds), *Bergson, Politics and Religion*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 99—125.

Soulez, P. and F. Worms (2002), *Bergson*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Tidmarsh, Jay (1994), 'A Process Theory of Torts', *Washington and Lee Law Review* 51.

- (1998), 'Whitehead's Metaphysics and the Law: A Dialogue', *Albany Law Review*, 62.

Wajihuddin, Mohammed (2005), 'Saare Jahan Se..., it's 100 Now', *The Times of India*, 19 April, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/saare-jahan-se-its-100-now/articleshow/1082625.cms>

Whitehead, Alfred North (1933), *Adventures in ideas*. New York: New America (1938)'; *Modes of Thought*, New York: Macmijlan.

Whitehead, A. N. ((1929] 1978), *Process and Reality*, (Corrected Edition), eds David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, New York: The Free Press.

Whitehead, A. N. ([1 920] 1997) *Science and the Modern World*, New York: The Free Press.

WiIdon Carr, H. (1914), *The Philosophy of Change: A Study of the Fundamental Principles of the Philosophy of Bergson*, London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd.